Supreme Court Verdict on the Role of Governor in State Legislature

 Supreme Court Verdict on the Role of the Governor in State Legislature.

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By :  Advocate SALIL KUMAR.P, Kozhikode, Ph : 8075113965

Introduction :

The constitutional scheme of India envisages for each State a Legislature comprising the Governor and the House or Houses of the Legislature. Under Article 200 of the Constitution, when a Bill passed by the State legislature is presented to the Governor, he has certain options: assent, withhold assent, reserve it for the President’s consideration, or return it (in the case of non-Money Bills) for reconsideration by the legislature. Similarly, under Article 201, when a Bill is reserved for the President’s consideration, the President may assent, withhold assent, or address it in the manner provided.

Recently the President of India, in exercise of the advisory jurisdiction under Article 143(1) of the Constitution, referred fourteen (14) questions to the Supreme Court relating to the interpretation of Articles 200 and 201, including whether the Governor/President could be subjected to judicially‐imposed timelines, whether so-called “deemed assent” applies, and whether the discretionary function is justiciable. The SC has now given its opinion.

The verdict is important for federalism, for the role of the Governor in state legislative process, and for the interface between executive discretion and judicial review.

Brief of the Verdict :

Here is a brief summary of the key findings of the Court:

The reference was made under Article 143(1) of the Constitution: on 13 May 2025 the President referred 14 questions to the Supreme Court concerning Articles 200 and 201.

On Article 200 (Governor and State Bills):

The Court clarifies that when a Bill is presented to the Governor under Article 200, the Governor has three constitutionally permissible options (not four): (i) assent; (ii) withhold assent (and in that event return the Bill to the Legislature for reconsideration, except for Money Bills); (iii) reserve the Bill for the President’s consideration.

The first provision to Article 200, which requires the Governor to return a Bill (except a Money Bill) if he withholds assent, is not a fourth option, but a qualification/limitation of the “withhold assent” option.

The Governor is not entirely bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers when exercising his functions under Article 200. While the general rule under Article 163 is that the Governor acts on aid and advice, the Court emphasised that where Article 200 gives him an option (e.g., reserving for President) he exercises discretion.

The Governor cannot simply hold on to a Bill indefinitely or adopt a “pocket veto”. Prolonged and unexplained inaction is susceptible to judicial scrutiny: the Court may issue a limited mandamus directing him to act within a reasonable period without examining the merits of his decision.

On Article 201 (President’s assent to state reserved Bills):

The President’s functions under Article 201 are not amenable to merits review; i.e., courts cannot revisit the wisdom of the President’s decision.

The Court held that in the absence of a constitutional time-frame, the Court cannot impose timelines on the President for acting under Article 201, just as it cannot for the Governor under Art 200. 

On timelines & “deemed assent” : 

The Constitution uses the phrase “as soon as possible” in the first provision of Article 200 (return of Bill). The absence of any time limit in the text means that the Court cannot itself prescribe rigid timelines for the Governor or President to act.

The concept of “deemed assent” (i.e., the Bill becoming law by operation of time) is alien to Articles 200 & 201; the Court rejected the idea that the law comes into force without the Governor's assent.

On justiciability & Article 361 : 

Although Article 361 grants personal immunity to the Governor and President from answerability in court for their acts in official capacity, it does not render their offices wholly immune from judicial scrutiny when there is prolonged inaction or mala fides. The Governor’s/President’s functions under Articles 200/201 are not entirely beyond review.

On federalism & Legislature-Executive dialogue : 

The Court emphasised that the role of the Governor in the legislative process must function within the federal scheme and cooperative federalism: the Governor cannot undermine the State Legislature’s autonomy by unreasonably withholding assent or reserving Bills for the President without good reasoning.

On previously laid down judgments : 

The Court noted that it was giving advisory opinion under Article 143, and not sitting in appeal over previous judgments. Thus, existing precedents remain in force unless specifically overruled.

Articles 200 & 201 – Text, Scope and Interpretation : 

Article 200

Article 200 of the Constitution (Chapter III of Part VI: “The State Legislature”) states:

“When a Bill (other than a Money Bill) is passed by the Legislature of a State, the Governor shall declare either that he assents to the Bill, or that he withholds assent thereto, or that he reserves the Bill for the consideration of the President. … Provided that in the case of a Bill which has been passed by the Legislature of the State after reconsideration in the Legislature in accordance with the message of the Governor under this article, the Governor shall not withhold assent thereto.” (emphasis supplied)

Second proviso: “… whenever it appears to the Governor that the Bill — (i) would, if it became law, so derogate from the powers of the High Court as to endanger the position of that Court; or (ii) is one which the Governor is required to reserve for the consideration of the President under sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of article 254 … he shall reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President.”

Key points of interpretation from the Court:

The verbs “assents”, “withholds assent” and “reserves” respectively mark the three distinct options.

The first proviso (which uses the phrase “the Governor shall not withhold assent…”) is not creating a separate “fourth” option; it mandates that if the legislature has reconsidered a Bill following the Governor’s message, then the Governor must give assent (i.e., cannot again withhold).

The second proviso delineates a situation where the Governor must reserve the Bill for the President when it “would … derogate from the powers of the High Court”. That is an instance where discretion is explicitly contemplated.

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The phrase “as soon as possible” in the first proviso requires promptness, but not a fixed timetable enforceable by the text.

Article 201

Article 201 provides:

“When the President has, by proclamation under clause (1) of article 356, or clause (1) of article 365, assumed to himself the functions of the Legislature of a State, then any Bill reserved for the consideration of the President under clause (a) of article 200 … the President may assent to the Bill, withhold assent thereto, or remit the Bill to the Legislature of the State for reconsideration. …”

Key interpretative points:

The President’s options are similarly limited; there is no express time-limit for the President’s decision.

The Court held that the President is not required to refer each reserved Bill to the Supreme Court under Article 143; only in exceptional or unclear cases may such a reference be made.

Precedents and Historical Context : 

Historical background

Under the Government of India Act, 1935, certain residuary and discretionary powers were vested in the Governor (and earlier the Governor-General) in colonial times. The framers of the Indian Constitution aimed to adapt and modulate these powers in the democratic federal scheme. The design of Article 200 reflects this transition from a colonial model to one where the Governor acts largely on ministerial aid and advice, except in specified situations.

The principle of cooperative federalism under the Indian Constitution emphasises that State Legislatures are not subordinate to the Governor in the exercise of ordinary legislative power. The Governor is part of the legislature, but is the nominal head, and must act within the constitutional framework.

Key judicial precedents : ,

Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974) 2 SCC 831: A seven-judge bench held that the phrase “in his discretion” is omitted in Article 200 (unlike Section 75 of the 1935 Act) and therefore the Governor’s power is not wholly unfettered but must be exercised in accordance with the Constitution. One of the few exceptions where discretionary power to reserve for the President is explicitly allowed (derogation of High Court).

of assent; fixed timelines were laid down in that decision (though this later referral has modified the timelines’ enforceability).

These precedents help frame the context in which the recent reference was decided.

Detailed Analysis of the Court’s Findings

Constitutional Options of the Governor under Article 200

The Court noted that three options stand out: assent, withhold (with return), or reserve for President. The first provision ensures that if the Bill is re-passed following the Governor’s message, assent must be given. The Court stressed that allowing the Governor to simply withhold assent indefinitely—without returning the Bill—would conflict with the federal structure and the role of the Legislature.

It emphasised that the Governor must adopt a “dialogic process” with the legislature: if he withholds assent, he must send a message with his reasons, and the legislature must reconsider. This reflects cooperative federalism.

Discretion vs. Aid & Advice : 

Ordinarily, under Article 163(1), the Governor shall act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. However, for Article 200, the Court held that the Governor enjoys a limited discretion when choosing among the options provided. The Court reasoned that if the Governor were strictly bound by the advice of the Ministers, then returning a Bill (which the Ministers themselves passed) would never happen. Hence the constitutional text (first & second provisos) implies discretion.

Nevertheless, that discretion is not unlimited. The Court underlined that the exceptions where the Governor acts independently are limited to the situations explicitly contemplated by Article 200 (for e.g., bills derogating from High Court powers) or other constitutional exceptions.

Timelines, Deemed Assent & Inaction : 

A major issue was whether the Court can prescribe timelines for the Governor/President to act. The Court said the Constitution does not prescribe any fixed timeframe for the Governor under Article 200 (except the phrase “as soon as possible” in the proviso). Similarly, no timeline for the President under Article 201. Consequently the Court held it would not be appropriate for the judiciary to unilaterally impose deadlines or a concept of “deemed assent”.

However, the Court held that prolonged, unexplained inaction by a Governor may lead to judicial intervention by way of limited mandamus — the Court may direct the Governor to act, but not decide what decision should be taken.

On “deemed assent”, the Court clarified that there is no room for a Bill to become law without the Governor’s (or President’s) assent under Articles 200/201; such a reading would undermine the constitutional scheme.

Justiciability & Article 361 : 

The Court reaffirmed that the merits of the Governor’s (or President’s) decision under Articles 200/201 are not subject to judicial review in terms of “was this the correct decision?” However, the Court held that the decision (or inaction) is justiciable in the narrow sense if there is prolonged, unexplained delay or mala fides. Article 361 protects the Governor’s personal immunity, but it does not give an absolute immunity to his office in the constitutional scheme.

Role of the President under Article 201 & Advisory Jurisdiction : 

The Court clarified that when a Bill is reserved for the President under Article 201, the President has the options mentioned; decisions by the President are likewise not subject to merits review. The President cannot be required to refer an issue to the SC under Article 143 every time; his subjective satisfaction is sufficient.

On the Court’s own role, it emphasised that in handling a Presidential Reference under Article 143, it is acting in an advisory capacity and not as an appellate body revisiting or overruling prior decisions.

Federalism and Dialogue : 

The Court emphasised that the Governor is not a mere “rubber stamp” but must act in good faith within the constitutional scheme. Simultaneously, the Governor cannot become a “road‐block” for legislation passed by the State Legislature; tranquillity in the legislative process is essential for federalism. The dialogic process between Governor and legislature is therefore central.

Implications & Key Take-aways : 

Governor’s discretion is real but constrained – The Governor can choose between the three options under Article 200, but cannot withhold assent indefinitely without returning the Bill for reconsideration (except in case of Money Bills).

No absolute veto/pocket veto – The verdict effectively prohibits a “pocket veto” where a Governor neither gives assent nor returns the Bill, leaving it in limbo.

No fixed judicially-imposed timelines – While the Court declines to set rigid timelines, it leaves open that in unusual circumstances it may issue a mandamus if the Governor sits endlessly on the Bill.

Role of President remains largely unchanged – Under Article 201, the President’s discretion survives; decisions are not subject to merits review.

Federal balance upheld – The legislature’s supremacy in its domain is reaffirmed; the Governor’s role must align with cooperative federalism and not undermine state autonomy.

Room for litigation remains – If a Governor acts arbitrarily, mala fide, or delays without explanation, the Courts may step in. This provides a check on the executive.

No “deemed assent” – A Bill will not become law merely by passage of time; the Governor’s assent remains constitutionally essential.

For State governments and advocates – This decision encourages State Legislatures to engage proactively with the Governor and avoid protracted stalemate; from a litigation standpoint, advice that delay by the Governor can be challenged, but merits of his decision cannot (save limited exceptions).

Citations of Key Questions Answered : 

Below are some of the questions (from the Presidential Reference) and how the Court answered them:

Q1: “What are the constitutional options before a Governor when a Bill is presented under Article 200?”

Answer: Assent; Withhold (and return) except in Money Bills; Reserve for President.

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Q2: “Is the Governor bound by the aid & advice of the Council of Ministers while exercising all the options under Article 200?”

Answer: Normally yes, but in the specific domain of Article 200 the Governor exercises limited discretion; he is not bound in the sense that he cannot act beyond advice if the text allows him a distinct power.

Q3: “Is the exercise of constitutional discretion by the Governor under Article 200 justiciable?”

Answer: The merits are not justiciable, but in case of prolonged, unexplained inaction (or mala fides) the function is justiciable to the extent of directing the Governor to act within reasonable time.

Q5: “In the absence of a constitutionally prescribed timeline, can timelines be imposed through judicial orders for the Governor under Article 200?”

Answer: No, rigid timelines cannot be judicially imposed, but inaction can invite limited remedy.

Q10: “Can the exercise of constitutional powers under Articles 200/201 be substituted under Article 142 of the Constitution?”

Answer: No; the Court held that it cannot use Article 142 to impose deemed assent or override constitutional scheme for assent.

Impact on Kerala & Practical Considerations : 

State government bills in Kerala passed by the Legislative Assembly when submitted to the Governor must be dealt with within a reasonable time; prolonged inaction by the Governor may now be challenged.

The Governor’s office must maintain a proper record of reasons where it withholds assent or reserves a Bill, to justify its exercise of discretion.

From the perspective of constitutional litigation in Kerala, the Court has made clear the remedy is not to challenge the merits of the Governor’s decision (except in narrow cases), but to challenge inaction.

For State legislative counsel, the decision emphasises the importance of engaging in a healthy “dialogue” with the Governor’s secretariat once a Bill is passed; returning a Bill under the first proviso is part of the process, not an adversarial act.

The decision also sends a signal to political actors: a Governor cannot indefinitely delay assent as a political tool without risking judicial oversight.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s advisory opinion offers clarity on the constitutional role of the Governor (and by extension the President) in the assent-to-Bills process under Articles 200 and 201. It balances the Governor’s discretion with the doctrine of cooperative federalism and emphasises legislative primacy at the State level. While avoiding fixed timelines, the Court preserves judicial oversight over unreasonable delays and reinforces that the legislative process cannot be stymied by executive inaction.

For practitioners and scholars alike, this decision provides a refined roadmap: the Governor must act, the legislature must engage, the judiciary must ensure that the process moves—but none of the three can assume absolute dominance.