You can critisize the Judgment, But, not the Judge" - Thats the Rule.

You Can Critisize a Judgment, But not the Judge : The Legal Boundaries in Light of Public Comments on the Dileep Acquittal Judgment by Ernakulam Sessions Court 

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By:

SALIL KUMAR.P

ADVOCATE

KOZHIKODE-673001

PH: K/136/1999

advocatesalil@gmail.com

I. Introduction

On the day the Ernakulam District and Sessions Court delivered its verdict in the 2017 actress assault case—convicting six accused and acquitting actor Dileep, who was alleged to be the principal conspirator—a wave of immediate reactions emerged from certain senior lawyers and a former Director General of Prosecution. These individuals publicly expressed displeasure with the acquittal, with some implying that the judge had erred in a manner warranting censure even before the judgment was made available.

Such reactions raise an important legal question: When does criticism of a judicial verdict amount to fair comment, and when does it enter the prohibited territory of “scandalising the court” under the law of contempt?

The question is not merely academic. Indian jurisprudence—particularly from the Supreme Court and the Kerala High Court—draws a very careful line between criticism of a judgment, which is constitutionally protected, and attacks on a judge, which may invite criminal contempt, criminal defamation, and professional disciplinary consequences.

This article analyses that distinction in detail.

II. Constitutional & Statutory Framework

1. Constitutional Powers

Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution vest the Supreme Court and the High Courts with the status of courts of record, having the inherent power to punish for contempt.

2. Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

Relevant provisions:

Section 2(c) defines criminal contempt to include publications (spoken or written) that:

scandalise or tend to scandalise the authority of the court,

interfere with judicial proceedings, or

interfere with the administration of justice.

Section 5 expressly protects fair criticism of judicial acts.

Section 13 (amended) provides that:

No punishment may be imposed unless the contempt substantially interferes with judicial administration.

Truth may be raised as a defence when made in public interest and in good faith.

3. Defamation under Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023

The new Section 356 BNS replaces IPC 499 and continues criminal defamation, protecting the reputation of individuals—including judges personally.

4. Advocates Act & BCI Rules

Advocates must maintain dignity of courts. Public attacks on judges may constitute professional misconduct.

III. The Foundational Principle: Criticise the Judgment, Not the Judge

Indian courts have always affirmed the democratic right to evaluate, disagree with, and even strongly criticise judicial verdicts. However, they jealously guard the institution and its judicial officers from baseless allegations of bias or corruption.

This distinction is captured powerfully in a series of landmark decisions.

IV. Supreme Court Precedents

1. Brahma Prakash Sharma v. State of U.P. (1953)

The Court distinguished between:

Legitimate criticism aimed at improving judicial functioning, and

Statements that lower the authority of courts by implying corruption or incompetence.

It held that even if intended for a limited audience, statements that “create an impression of judicial dishonesty” amount to criminal contempt.

2. E.M.S. Namboodiripad v. T. Narayanan Nambiar (1970)

The former Kerala Chief Minister accused judges of class bias.

The Court convicted him, holding:

Criticism that attributes motives to judges or undermines public confidence in their impartiality constitutes criminal contempt.

This principle is directly relevant to public insinuations that the Sessions Judge acquitted Dileep for improper reasons.

3. P.N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shankar (1988)

A key case protecting free speech.

The Court held that:

Strong criticism of judgments—even by a Union Minister—does not amount to contempt unless motives are attributed.

Courts must be robust to public scrutiny in a democracy.

Thus:

“Judgment wrong” → Permissible

“Judge biased/corrupt” → Contempt

4. Indirect Tax Practitioners’ Assn. v. R.K. Jain (2010)

The Court emphasised that:

Truth and public interest are valid shields under Section 13,

Criticism backed by facts, even if harsh, is not contempt.

5. In Re: Arundhati Roy (2002) & In Re: Prashant Bhushan (2020)

These cases reaffirmed that:

Criticising an institution’s functioning may be permissible,

But vilification of judges alleging bias, dishonesty, or ulterior motives without proof crosses into criminal contempt.

The Court stressed that such attacks erode public trust in justice delivery.

6. D.C. Saxena v. CJI (1996)

The accused made reckless allegations of corruption against the Chief Justice of India.

The Court held:

Any baseless allegation of corruption or bias against a judge is per se contempt.

This authority is directly applicable to reckless statements by public figures after the Dileep verdict.

V. Kerala High Court Precedents: Clear and Strict Approach

Kerala has some of the most relevant and stringent rulings, especially in the context of public criticism by political leaders and social media users.

1. In Re: M.V. Jayarajan (Kerala HC) & M.V. Jayarajan v. High Court of Kerala (SC, 2015)

A political leader used abusive words for judges after a judgment.

High Court convicted him; the Supreme Court upheld the conviction, observing:

“Vituperative criticism of judges undermines the rule of law and constitutes criminal contempt.”

This case shows that public speeches attacking judges personally attract immediate contempt action.

2. Suo Motu v. R. Rajesh (Kerala HC, 2025)

A former MLA suggested on Facebook that judges were ideologically biased.

The Court took suo motu contempt, holding:

He did not criticise the judgment, but criticised the judges.

Imputation of political/ideological bias prima facie amounts to scandalising the court.

This directly parallels any insinuation that the Sessions Judge favoured actor Dileep due to influence or pressure.

3. Suo Motu v. P.K. Suresh Kumar (Kerala HC, 2025)

Repeated social media posts alleged:

Judges were acting for a political organisation,

Decisions were made with ulterior motives.

The Court sentenced him to imprisonment, noting:

“When criticism becomes a deliberate vilification of judges, it constitutes criminal contempt.”

VI. Applying the Law to Public Comments on the Dileep Verdict

Permissible

Senior lawyers or public figures may legally say:

“The acquittal is unsustainable based on available evidence,”

“The prosecution’s conspiracy theory was not properly appreciated,”

“An appeal would be appropriate,”

“The judgment reflects misinterpretation of precedents.”

This is fair criticism, even if intense.

Impermissible / Contemptuous

Statements imply criminal contempt when they:

Impute bias (“Judge favoured the accused due to influence/pressure”)

Impute corruption (“Judge was compromised / bought”)

Suggest ulterior motives (“Judge protected the film lobby”)

Attack competence in abusive terms

Are made recklessly without reading the judgment

Each of these falls within Section 2(c) and the jurisprudence of:

Jayarajan,

EMS Namboodiripad,

Saxena,

Prashant Bhushan,

R. Rajesh, and

P.K. Suresh Kumar.

Such conduct may expose the speaker to:

Criminal contempt,

Criminal defamation under Section 356 BNS, and

Bar Council disciplinary action (if an advocate).

VII. Does the Absence of the Written Judgment Matter?

Yes, though not legally decisive.

Public criticism before reading the judgment suggests:

Recklessness,

Lack of bona fides, and

Absence of public interest motivation.

In such cases, courts may more readily find contempt.

VIII. Conclusion

The legal position is crystal clear:

Criticism of a judgment—even strong, even emotional—is constitutionally protected speech.

Criticism of a judge’s motives, integrity, impartiality, or honesty is criminal contempt unless supported by verifiable facts.

Therefore:

Public figures who blame the Sessions Judge for Dileep’s acquittal without reading the judgment and by making insinuations against the judge personally may be treading dangerously close to the boundary of criminal contempt—especially under the strict and well-established jurisprudence of the Kerala High Court.

The judiciary welcomes scrutiny, but it does not permit reckless attacks that corrode public confidence.